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Abstract. This paper presents first experimental results for an IP telephony-
based steganographic method called LACK (Lost Audio PaCKets 
steganography). This method utilizes the fact that in typical multimedia 
communication protocols like RTP (Real-Time Transport Protocol), 
excessively delayed packets are not used for the reconstruction of transmitted 
data at the receiver, i.e. these packets are considered useless and discarded. 
The results presented in this paper were obtained basing on a functional 
LACK prototype and show the method’s impact on the quality of voice 
transmission. Achievable steganographic bandwidth for the different IP 
telephony codecs is also calculated. 
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1. Introduction 
VoIP (Voice over IP) is a real-time service which enables users to make phone calls through data 
networks that use an IP protocol. Generally, VoIP connection consists of two phases: a signalling phase and 
a conversation phase. In both phases certain types of traffic are exchanged between calling parties. After the 
signalling messages e.g. SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [37] messages are exchanged between the caller 
and callee, and the connection is successful, the conversation takes place, in form of audio streams - RTP 
(Real-Time Transport Protocol) [2] streams - which are sent bidirectional. The popularity of this technology 
has caused a continuous rise in the volume of VoIP traffic. Thus, it may be increasingly targeted for 
steganographic purposes [35]. Steganographic methods allow for hiding the very existence of the 
communication, so a third-party observer will not suspect anything if they are unaware of the 
steganographic exchange. Steganography encompasses information hiding techniques that embed a secret 
message (steganogram) into the carrier. 
Lost Audio PaCKets steganography (LACK) is an IP telephony steganographic method, which modifies 
both: RTP packets from the voice stream, and their time dependencies. This method takes advantage of the 
fact that in typical multimedia communication protocols, like RTP, excessively delayed packets are not 
used for the reconstruction of transmitted data at the receiver, i.e. the packets are considered useless and 
discarded. LACK was originally proposed in [17] and studied further in [16]. The contribution of this paper 
is the practical evaluation of the influence that LACK has on voice transmission quality. Further advances 
involve the assessment of its potential steganographic bandwidth for different IP telephony codecs. This 
was achieved by means of constructing a LACK prototype and conducting appropriate experiments at 
different levels of intentional losses. 
The detailed overview of LACK functioning is presented in Fig. 1. At the transmitter (Alice), one RTP 
packet is selected from the voice stream and its payload is substituted with bits of the secret message – the 
steganogram (1). Then, the selected audio packet is intentionally delayed prior to its transmission (2).  
Whenever an excessively delayed packet reaches a receiver unaware of the steganographic procedure, it is 
discarded, because it interprets the hidden data as “invisible”. However, if the receiver (Bob) is aware of the 
hidden communication, then, instead of dropping the received RTP packet, it extracts the payload (3). Due 
to the fact that the payload of the intentionally delayed packets is sole vector used to transmit secret 
information to receivers aware of the procedure, therefore no surplus packets are generated. 
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LACK is a TCP/IP application layer steganography technique and is fairly easy to implement. This may 
be attributed to the fact that RTP is usually integrated into telephone endpoints (softphones), therefore 
access generation and modification of RTP packets is easier to perform than in the case of the lower layer 
protocols like IP or UDP. 
LACK, as any network steganography method, can be characterised by the following set of features: its 
steganographic bandwidth, undetectability and its steganographic cost. The term - steganographic 
bandwidth - refers to the amount of secret data that we are able to send per time unit when using a particular 
method. Undetectability is defined as the inability to detect a steganogram within a certain carrier. The most 
popular way to detect a steganogram is to analyse statistical properties of the captured data and compare it 
with the typical properties of that carrier. The steganographic cost characterises the degree of degradation of 
the carrier caused by the steganogram insertion procedure. For LACK, this cost can be expressed by means 
of providing a measure of conversation degradation.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The idea of LACK  
 
Steganalysis of LACK is hard to perform because packet loss in IP networks is a “natural phenomenon”. 
A packet is considered lost if: it is discarded in the network– in this case it never reaches the receiver. Such 
a situation may be caused, e.g., by buffer overflow in some intermediate device caused by a bottleneck 
within a network; it is dropped by the jitter buffer– when an RTP packet is excessively delayed due to 
network latency it reaches the receiver but is useless as it cannot be used for voice reconstruction; thus, it is 
discarded and counted as lost. Moreover, due to so-called delay spikes, the jitter buffer, in addition to 
dropping late packets (drops caused by buffer underflow) may also drop subsequent RTP packets because 
they may all arrive simultaneously and the size of the jitter buffer may be insufficient to store them all 
(buffer overflow). Results from study in [38] revealed that about 80% of performed Internet calls 
experienced about 0.5% of physical RTP packet losses and about 30% of the call 2% or more jitter buffer 
losses. Therefore, intentional losses introduced by LACK are not easy to detect, if kept on a reasonable 
level. Potential LACK steganalysis methods include:  
• Statistical analysis of lost packets for calls in a sub-network. This type of steganalysis may be 
implemented with a passive warden [18] (or some other network node), based, for example, on 
information included in RTCP reports (the cumulative number of packets lost field) exchanged 
between users during their communication or by observing RTP stream flows (packets’ sequence 
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numbers). If for some of the observed calls the number of lost packets is higher than average (or 
some chosen threshold), this criterion may be used as an indication for the potential use of LACK. 
• Statistical analysis based on the VoIP calls duration. If the call duration probability distribution for 
a certain sub-network is known, then statistical steganalysis may be performed to discover VoIP 
sources that do not fit to the distribution (the duration of LACK calls may be longer compared to 
non-LACK calls as a result of introducing steganographic data). 
• An active warden [18] that analyses all RTP streams in the network (SSRC identifier and fields: 
Sequence Number and Timestamp from RTP header) can identify packets that are already too late 
to be used for voice reconstruction. The active warden may erase their payload fields or simply 
drop them. A potential problem that arises in this case is to avoid eliminating delayed packets that 
may still be used for conversation reconstruction. The size of the jitter buffer at the receiver is, in 
principle, unknown to the active warden. If an active warden drops all delayed packets, then it will 
potentially drop packets that still can be useful for voice reconstruction. In effect, the quality of 
conversation may deteriorate considerably. Moreover, not only steganographic calls are affected; 
non-steganographic calls are also “punished”. 
 
If the VoIP call is secured using SRTP [39] it has no influence on LACK utilisation. Moreover, it 
makes LACK even less susceptible to detection. It is due to fact that even if warden captures all RTP 
packets it will not be able to reconstruct voice conversation because it is encrypted and thus it will be 
unable to spot steganogram inside these packets. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents existing VoIP steganographic methods. 
Section 3 discusses the factors that have impact on the LACK steganographic bandwidth, its undetectability 
and cost. Section 4 describes the prototype LACK implementation, experiment methodology and discusses 
the obtained results. Section 5 concludes this work. 
 
2. Related Work 
IP telephony as a hidden data carrier was discovered by researchers rather late. Proposed 
steganographic methods have been developed, generally, from two distinctive research origins. Firstly, from 
the well-established image and audio files steganography [19] – these methods targeted voice digital 
representation as a hidden data carrier. Secondly, from the covert channels created in different network 
protocols [20, 21] – these solutions targeted specific VoIP protocols fields (e.g. signalling protocol – SIP, 
transport protocol – RTP or control protocol – RTCP) or the way these protocols behave and interact. 
Today, steganographic methods that can be used in telecommunication networks have been described by 
term network steganography or when applied, specifically, to IP telephony by term steganophony [35]. 
First VoIP steganographic methods that utilised carried voice as a hidden data carrier were proposed by 
Dittmann et al. in 2005 [22]. Authors proposed evaluation of existing audio steganography with a special 
focus on solutions which are suitable for VoIP. This work was later extended and published in 2006 in [23]. 
In [25] implementation of the SteganRTP tool was described which to carry steganograms used least 
significant bits (LSB) of G.711 codec. Wang and Wu in [26] also suggested using least significant bits in 
voice samples but to carry bits of secret communication which was coded using lower rate voice codec like 
Speex. In [27] Takahashi and Lee introduced similar approach by presenting proof of concept tool – Voice 
over VoIP (Vo2IP) that can establish a hidden conversation by embedding further compressed voice data 
into regular PCM-based voice traffic. They also considered other audio steganography methods that can be 
utilized in VoIP like DSSS, FHSS or Echo hiding. Aoki in [28] proposed steganographic method based on 
the characteristics of PCMU in which 0 speech sample can be represented by two codes due to the overlap. 
Another LSB-based method was proposed by Tian et al. in [32]. Authors incorporated the m-sequence 
technique to eliminate the correlation among secret messages to resist the statistical detection. Another 
similar approach (also LSB-based) for adaptive VoIP steganography by the same authors was introduced in 
[33]; a proof of concept tool - StegTalk – was also developed. In [34] Miao and Huang presented an 
adaptive steganography scheme that is based on smoothness of the speech block. Such approach proved to 
give better results in terms of voice quality than LSB method. 
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Utilisation of the VoIP-specific protocols as a steganogram carrier was first proposed by Mazurczyk 
and Kotulski in [24] to embed control information into the VoIP streams. Unused bits in the headers of IP, 
UDP and RTP protocols carry the type of parameters and actual parameter values are embedded as 
watermark in the voice data. In [29] and [17] Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski described steganographic 
methods that can be used for VoIP signalling protocol – SIP (with SDP) and RTP streams (with RTCP), 
respectively. They discovered that when combined steganographic methods during signalling phase are able 
to transfer about 2000 bits of steganogram and during the conversation phase about 2.5 kbit/s. Bai et al. in 
[31] proposed covert channel based on jitter field of the RTCP header. First, statistical parameters of the 
jitter field in the current network are calculated. Then, the secret message is modulated into the jitter field 
according to the previously calculated parameters. By utilising such modulation the characteristic of the 
covert channel is similar to that of the overt one. In [36] Forbes proposed new RTP-based steganographic 
method that modifies timestamp value in the RTP header to send steganograms. The method steganographic 
bandwidth is theoretically up to 350 bit/s. 
 
3. Factors that Impact LACK Performance  
The general principle in LACK is that the more hidden information is inserted into the voice stream, the 
greater the chance that it will be detected, i.e. by scanning the data flow or applying some other steganalysis 
(detection) method. Secondly, the more audio packets are used to send covert data, the greater the 
deterioration of the quality of IP telephony connection. This, in turn, results in a greater steganographic cost. 
Therefore, the procedure of the insertion of hidden data must be carefully chosen and controlled in order to 
minimize the chance of the detection of the inserted data and to avoid excessive deterioration of the QoS 
(Quality of Service). That is why certain trade-offs between the achieved steganographic bandwidth, call 
quality deterioration and resistance to detection are (always) indispensable. 
The performance of LACK depends on many factors which can be divided into three following groups: 
• Endpoint-related factors: the type of voice codec used (in particular, its resistance to packet losses 
and the default voice quality), size of the RTP packet payload and the size of the jitter buffer. 
• Network-related factors: packet delay, packet loss probability and jitter. 
• LACK-related factors: the number of intentionally delayed RTP packets, the delay of the LACK 
packets and hidden data insertion rate (IR), which corresponds to the number of steganogram’s bits 
carried per unit of time [bit/s]. 
 
3.1 Endpoint-related factors 
To guarantee that an RTP packet will be deemed lost by the receiver, it must be excessively, intentionally 
delayed by the LACK procedure. To set this delay dL(t) properly, the size of the receiver’s jitter buffer must 
be taken into account. A jitter buffer is used to alleviate the jitter effect, i.e. the variations in packets arrival 
time caused by queuing, contention and serialization in the network. The size of the buffer is 
implementation-dependent. It may be fixed or adaptive, and is usually between 60 and 120 ms;. An RTP 
packet will be recognized as lost whenever its delay exceeds the delay introduced by the jitter buffer. 
LACK users must exchange information about the sizes of their jitter buffers prior to starting the hidden 
communication. To limit the risk of disclosure of a steganogram, the delay chosen by LACK should be as 
low as possible. The delay of an RTP packet (dT) may be calculated as follows  
 (2-1) 
where: 
dD – delay introduced by DSP (Digital Signal Processor), which depends on the type of the codec and 
typically ranges from 2 to 20 ms,  
dK  – delay introduced by voice coding (typically under 10 ms),  
dE  – delay caused by encapsulation (from 20 to 30 ms). 
dL(t) – the intentional delay of an RTP packet introduced by LACK, 
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As mentioned above, the value of the intentional delay dL(t), introduced by LACK, must be carefully 
chosen. Together with dN(t), introduced by the network, it must exceed the size of the jitter buffer (Fig. 2), 
that is 
 (2-2) 
where: 
dN (t) – delay introduced by the network, 
tB(t) – the size of the jitter buffer  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The LACK delay components 
 
The jitter buffer can be of a fixed or adaptive size. If the jitter buffer has a fixed size during the call, 
and it does not take into account information about delay caused by network then delay at the transmitter 
side should be 
 (2-3) 
and  
 (2-4) 
Consequently, a fixed size jitter buffer that reacts to the current delay dN(t), introduced by the network 
during the call, then the delay at the transmitter output is  
 (2-5) 
thus 
 (2-6) 
If the current value of dN(t) is not known at the transmitter, then one can utilise the average value of the 
delay calculated over a certain time period. 
If the adaptive jitter buffer is used at the receiver, and the information regarding its size is not passed to 
the transmitter during the call, then the relation dT(t) ≥ tB(t) should be fulfilled. This is to ensure that 
intentionally delayed RTP packets will not be used for voice reconstruction. Due to the fact that delays dD, 
dK and dE are constant, then ensuring dT(t)≥ tB(t) is possible when 
 (2-7) 
where tB*  denotes the maximum, admissible size of the adaptive jitter buffer. 
 
Under the considered conditions, if the receiver is equipped in an adaptive jitter buffer and it is possible 
to advertise its size during the call, then its initial size can be communicated during the signalling phase of 
the call. This imposes that the delay at the transmitter output dT(0) is set equal to the maximum possible size 
)()()( tttdtd BNT >+
BT td ≥
EKDBL dddtd −−−≥
)()( tdttd NBT −≥
)()( tddddttd NEKDBL −−−−≥
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of the jitter buffer – dT(0) ≥ tB*. It can be further decreased, by means of reducing dL(t), which is possible if 
appropriate information about the variations in size of the jitter buffer reaches the transmitter during the call. 
When an adaptive jitter buffer is employed, and the transmitter is informed of the current network delay 
dN(t) then  
 (2-8) 
The other factor that influences LACK is the VoIP codec used for the conversation. The greater codec 
resistance to packet losses the more favourable it is for LACK purposes. The admissible level of packet 
losses for different voice codecs usually ranges from 1 to 5%. For example, according to [ 12], the 
maximum loss tolerance equals 1% for G.723.1, 2% for G.729A and 3% for G.711 codecs. The usage of 
mechanisms that deal with lost packets at the receiver, e.g. the PLC (Packet Loss Concealment) [ 3] results 
in an increase in the acceptable level of packet losses, e.g. for G.711 the shift is from 3% to 5%. The greater 
the codec resistance to packet losses, the greater the capacity for achieving a significant LACK 
steganographic bandwidth. Thus, the quantity of covert data liable for insertion by LACK procedure and, 
consequentially, the additional, induced packet losses depends on the acceptable level of the cumulative 
packet loss.  
It is also worth noting that the use of silence suppression mechanism in the transmitting endpoint can 
further decrease the available steganographic bandwidth in which to hide secret messages. 
 
3.2 Network-related factors 
Let us assume that, at a given moment of the call t, an RTP packet is chosen from the voice packets 
stream for LACK purposes with probability pL(t) and the network packet loss probability is pN(t). If pT 
denotes the maximum permitted probability of RTP packet losses then, assuming the independence of the 
network-related losses from LACK-induced losses, we get 
  (2-9) 
and, in consequence 
 (2-10) 
which describes the admissible level of RTP packet losses introduced by LACK. Exemplary relationships 
between probabilities pL(t), pN(t) and pT are illustrated in Fig. 3.  
To ensure a high steganographic bandwidth and the undetectability of LACK, it is necessary to monitor 
network conditions while the call lasts. In particular, packets losses, delay and jitter introduced by the 
network must be observed. They have influence on the range of permitted values of the delay and packet 
losses introduced by LACK without the degradation of the perceived quality of the conversation. Due to the 
fact that LACK exploits for its purposes legitimate RTP traffic, an increase in the overall packets losses is 
triggered. Thus, the number of lost packets used for steganographic purposes must be controlled and 
dynamically adapted. 
Information concerning current network conditions can be provided to the transmitter, among others, 
with the aid of SR (Sender Report), RR (Receiver Report) [2] or XR (Extended Report) [14] reports that are 
defined in the RTCP protocol. The lack of monitoring of network parameters during a call does not hinder 
the possibility of determining their values, what can be achieved with the aid of historical, statistical data 
related to the network performance. However, it should be noted that RTP packet losses introduced by 
network can provoke a decrease in the LACK steganographic bandwidth, which is the case if the lost packet 
belongs to the steganographic RTP stream. 
 
3.3 LACK-related factors 
In previous subsections we mentioned two important parameters that require setting for proper LACK 
functioning. These are: the probability that a certain RTP packet is chosen for LACK purposes (pL(t)), and 
the delay dL(t), which is preset to guarantee that an audio packet will be recognized as lost at the receiver. 
Another key factor influencing LACK steganographic bandwidth and its resistance to steganalysis is the 
))(1))((1(1 tptpp LNT −−−≤
)(1
)()(
tp
tpp
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N
NT
L
−
−≤
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hidden data insertion rate IR(t), which is defined as a number of steganograms’ bits carried in every time 
unit of the call [bit/s]. In general, the greater IR(t), the greater is the achievable steganographic bandwidth. 
This couples with the degradation of voice quality and easier steganalysis. The limits imposed on the 
maximum insertion rate depend on the targeted acceptable call quality, network conditions, the size of the 
steganogram and also by the duration of the call. The correct determination of IR(t) facilitates efficient 
control of RTP packet losses and delays introduced by LACK, without excessively deteriorating the call 
quality and risking detection. The methods for determining IR(t) based on current conversation quality, the 
size of the steganogram and the duration of the call were considered in [16]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 The impact of LACK on the total packet loss probability 
 
4. Practical Evaluation of LACK’s Impact on Call Quality 
Call quality may be expressed in terms of subjective and objective quality measures. Objective measures 
are usually based on algorithms such as the E-Model [4], PAMS or PESQ [6]. The objective measures can 
be transformed into subjective quality measures. In our analysis we shall use the subjective measure MOS 
(Mean Opinion Score) [5] which is calculated by PESQ method. 
 
4.1 LACK Prototype and Experiment Methodology 
Implementation of LACK prototype was based on the MjSip [9] project. It is a Java implementation of 
an IP telephony softphone based on the SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) signalling protocol. Only the user 
agent application was utilised. The SIP server was omitted because it does not affect the results of 
experiments (the RTP streams are exchanged directly between end users, without the participation of a SIP 
server). A simple PLC (Packet Loss Concealment) method was implemented in the SIP User Agent 
application, as softphones usually have some way to deal with packets losses. PLC mechanisms are used to 
limit quality degradation caused by packet losses by means of compensating the lost ones – in the simplest 
scenario, they insert a duplicate of the last received packet as a substitute for the lost one [3]. The described 
PLC algorithm was added to the SIP User Agent application. 
The LACK algorithm proved to be easily implementable, and its main principles shall be described in the 
following clause. In our implementation, every RTP packet selected for LACK purposes had a payload 
consisting of two parts: a steganogram and a hash. The hash was computed for the steganogram carried in 
that packet with the aid of the MD5 (Message Digest 5) hash function. The amendment of the hash enables 
the receiver to distinguish LACK packets from ordinary, non-steganographic packets. 
Two parameters of the LACK method were studied: the probability that a packet is used for LACK 
purposes (pL) and the intentional delay of LACK packets (dL). For each RTP packet, a pseudo-random 
number between 0 and 1 was generated, and it was tested whether it exceeds the threshold probability of 
sending a LACK packet. If this was the case, the considered packet was chosen for steganographic purposes. 
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During the deployment of LACK, a problem concerning the inaccuracy of the sleep function in Java was 
encountered. This function was used to determine the time interval between consecutive packets. The 
inaccuracy of the Java function resulted in imprecise timings of data packets. We solved the problem by 
introducing compensation of the delays at the receiver. 
 
4.2 Experiment Methodology 
The experimental setup used to evaluate LACK’s impact on voice quality is presented in Fig. 4. The 
experimental environment was a controlled LAN network, so no RTP packets were lost or excessively 
delayed, unless intended. No RTP packets were dropped by the jitter buffer, which permitted us to evaluate 
the sole impact of LACK on voice quality, without any network-related or endpoint-related interferences.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4 MLS experimental setup  
 
The voice packet payload was selected from TIMIT [8] speech samples database and compiled into 
single .wav file. Both male and female voices were used. The resulting .wav input file was about 30 seconds 
long. The adopted coding involved PCM, 8000 Hz sampling, 16 bit sample representation of monophonic 
signal. It was ensured that the setup conformed to ITU-T P.862.3 recommendation [7] requirements 
fulfilling which ensure proper PESQ method functioning. The obtained results were normalized to 9 
minutes, as it was experimentally verified that the average call duration for IP telephony falls in the range 
7-11 minutes [11]. The 9 minute representation was chosen to show how much secret data can be sent 
during a typical IP telephony call. The input .wav file was encoded with different voice codecs and its parts 
were then inserted into the payloads of consecutive RTP packets. Table I provides a summary and 
characteristics of the voice codecs used in the experiment. A variety of codecs were chosen to provide a 
comparative analysis of possible IP telephony call configurations – the choice involved selection of voice 
codec and appropriate data rate (from 8 to 64 kbits). The voice codecs used in the experiment were: G.711 
A-law [3], GSM-FR (Full Rate) [1] and Speex (8 and 24.6 kbits) [13]. 
 
Table I Speech codecs used in the experiment 
Voice codecs G.711 A-law Speex I GSM-FR Speex II 
Bit rate [kbit/s] 64 24.6 13.2 8 
RTP packet every [ms] 20 20 20 20 
Voice payload size [bytes] 160 61.5 33 20 
 
The second step of the procedure involved the modification of the RTP stream by means of performing 
the LACK steganographic method (the introduction of intentional losses, for which the selection probability, 
pLACK, was picked from the range 0.001 to 0.05). Next, the RTP stream was directed to the receiver, where 
the voice conversation was reconstructed and saved to the output .wav file.  Then, the original (input) and 
degraded (output) .wav files were compared with the aid of the PESQ method, and the MOS-LQO (Mean 
Opinion Score-Listening Quality Objective) value was obtained. By performing the experiments in a strictly 
controlled environment with no network or jitter buffer losses and without excessive delays, we were able 
to assess the real influence of LACK on the conversation quality. Each experiment was repeated 10 times, 
and the average results are presented in the following section. 
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4.3 Experimental Results 
The obtained experimental results are presented in Table II and Fig. 5 and 6 (σ denotes standard 
deviation). 
 
Table II Experimental results 
 G.711 A-law Speex I (24.6 kbps) GSM-FR Speex II (8kbps) 
pLACK MOS-LQO SB [bit/s] MOS-LQO SB [bit/s] MOS-LQO SB [bit/s] MOS-LQO SB [bit/s] 
Av. σ Av. σ Av. σ Av. σ Av. σ Av. σ Av. σ Av. σ 
0.001 4.015 0.02 84.48 32.13 3.992 0.15 22.29 16.14 3.269 0.26 3.62 2.03 3.527 0.03 3.02 2.07 
0.005 3.91 0.06 376.32 154.56 3.553 0.39 72 27.36 2.347 0.23 52.13 13.09 3.487 0.07 8 1.38 
0.01 3.865 0.09 591.36 168.7 3.261 0.44 228 51.61 2.078 0.14 59.84 11.73 3.419 0.05 16.18 2.97 
0.02 3.622 0.05 1236.48 235.78 3.059 0.21 376.8 18.2 1.884 0.18 134.19 28.78 3.28 0.07 39.73 8.05 
0.03 3.597 0.11 1735.68 170.44 2.946 0.35 602.4 104.41 1.568 0.13 227.57 10.82 3.144 0.08 57.17 7.57 
0.05 3.338 0.09 2872.32 178.88 2.876 0.59 1039.2 120.18 1.286 0.04 369.92 36.35 2.964 0.11 89.39 10.35 
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Fig. 5 Voice quality results (MOS-LQO) 
 
As anticipated, the presented results prove that the best choice for LACK purposes is the G.711 codec, as 
it can sustain RTP packet losses exceeding 5% and still provide voice quality with a MOS score greater 
than 3 (which is considered as fair). Simultaneously, the G.711-based LACK provides the largest 
steganographic bandwidth, e.g. at the level of 1% of LACK packet losses it offers about 590 bit/s (Fig. 6). 
Such performance is achievable because the voice payload size in each RTP packet is 160 bytes, which is 
considerably more than for any other chosen codec (Speex I – 61.5, GSM – 33 and Speex II – 20 bytes).  
Speex I codec with a bit rate of 24.6 kbit/s turned out to give worse results in voice quality (Fig. 5) than 
G.711 (64 kb/s). The surprising observation is that Speex I performance was worse than Speex’s II (8 
kbit/s) – when LACK loss rate exceeded 0.75% it experienced a 0.2 drop in MOS score relative to Speex II. 
On the other hand, tests performed for a 1% LACK loss rate proved that Speex I is capable of achieving a 
larger steganographic bandwidth (230 bit/s compared to 16 bit/s for Speex II), which may be attributed to a 
higher bitrate and larger payload size of this codec. Such performance is possible with the simultaneous 
preservation of a still higher than fair quality (MOS scores for Speex I – 3.26, Speex II – 3.42). The GSM 
FR codec offered the poorest voice quality even for low levels of introduced LACK losses (>0.1%) and thus 
it is least suitable for LACK purposes. 
In general, the highest values of the steganographic bandwidth are achieved when LACK intentionally 
delays numerous RTP packets. Thus, the high bit rate codecs are preferred over low bit rate ones. Currently, 
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one of the most popular voice codecs used almost in all IP telephony soft- and hard-phones is G.711, which 
proved to be suitable for LACK.  
However, in real-life IP networks, LACK may not introduce as many intentional losses as in the 
experiment (i.e. significantly less than 5%). Causing excess losses can have a great impact on voice quality 
because the packet drops cumulate with the network and jitter buffer losses (see Section 3). 
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Fig. 6 LACK steganographic bandwidth  
 
On the other hand, from the network security point of view, the usage of low bit rate voice codecs in IP 
telephony services can limit LACK steganographic bandwidth. For example, at a LACK loss rate equal to 
0.1%, G.711 provided 85 bit/s steganographic bandwidth, while Speex II offered only about 3 bit/s. 
However, even such low value of steganographic bandwidth is still considered insecure [10], so additional 
steganalysis methods should be utilised to detect and/or eliminate hidden communication, e.g. methods that 
were proposed in [16].  
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, an IP telephony steganographic method, named LACK, was subjected to the first practical 
evaluation. The aim of this paper was to study LACK’s impact on the quality of voice transmission and the 
achievable steganographic bandwidth for different IP telephony codecs. This was considered in a broader 
context of the characterisation of factors that influence LACK steganographic bandwidth, cost and 
undetectability.   
The obtained results show that from the LACK perspective the most favourable voice codecs are those of 
high bit rates (e.g. G.711). They are capable of accommodating higher steganographic bandwidths than low 
bit rate codecs, while being more immune to packet losses. This imposes that for such codecs the 
steganographic cost of utilizing LACK is lower. From the network security point of view, the deployment 
of low bit rate codes in IP telephony systems is preferable because it constrains the potential LACK 
bandwidth. However, low bit rate voice codecs cannot be treated as a universal solution for this type of 
covert communication. Still, to provide ability to detect or eliminate LACK hidden communication proper 
steganalysis method must be utilized. 
Future work should involve an experimental evaluation of the LACK method in a real-life network 
environments e.g. in a WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network), with the employment of a wide range of 
voice codecs and different PLC mechanisms.  
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